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The translation into French of this text has been published in our issue num.52: “Para-
private coercion companies : new mercenaries ?”
1 This paper examines how the construction of international law enables it to act as an
agent of control over mercenaries and Private military companies. International treaties
established to control the use of mercenaries include the Additional Protocol I and II to
Article  47 of  the Geneva Convention (1949),  the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU)
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1972),  and the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989).
These treaties regulate, for the most part, the relationship between states concerned with
the use of international private violence, understood as mercenarism. Even so, as is made
clear below, these treaties are far from perfect. Indeed, they reflect international tension
between the West and parts of the Third World, notably Africa, over what these states see
as the West’s  willingness to tolerate mercenary activities beyond their borders.  Such
political tension was clearly evident during the 1960s and 70s in postcolonial Africa, and
forced the international  community to focus significant attention on the activities of
mercenaries. Yet, such suspicions toward mercenaries have never been translated into
outright legal condemnation through international law. 
International Law and the Control of Mercenaries and Private Military Companies
Cultures & Conflits , English documents | 2008
1
2 The fact that this is so, has much to do with how African states have come to understand
sovereignty and its relationship to mercenary forces over the last 40 years. While the
difficulty of establishing a definition has frequently been discussed in the literature this
paper addresses how the problem of definition is tied to political problems associated
with the unwillingness to prohibit the use of mercenaries.  As Holds Bashir explains, ‘[i]t
is difficult to define what a mercenary is. This is because the word has different meanings
at different times. The different meanings it has acquired throughout history depend on
the  spirit  of  the  age’.1 This  problem  still  exists  today.  Thus,  mercenaries  are  only
mercenaries when it suits the political agenda of states to define them in this context,
and this is reflected in the international treaties mentioned above. As this paper explains,
these treaties do not prohibit  the use of international private violence.  Instead,  such
violence is allowed as long as it benefits the states that drew up the international treaties
in the first place. This is the position of the private organisations mentioned below. While
security  companies,  including  Military  Professional  Resources  Incorporated  (MPRI),
Group4,  and Control  Risk Group,  have been described as mercenary by organisations
opposed to  private  violence involvement  in  state  affairs,2 governments,  in  particular
Western governments, have resisted attaching the mercenary label to these companies,
since their activities are understood as addressing the legitimate security concerns of
states. 
3 This paper examines the legal problems caused by the recent emergence in international
security  of  private  military  companies.  The  first  part  of  the  paper  traces  the  legal
argument associated with employing mercenaries. In particular, the paper examines the
complex  nature  of  those  Conventions that  attempt  to  establish  a  clear  definition  of
mercenarism.  It  shows  how  the  present  definition  of  mercenarism,  which  served  a
political  purpose  during  the  period  of  decolonisation,  and still  does  today,  makes  it
extremely easy for the private security industry to exploit loopholes in international law
that allow them to offer their services to leaders in charge of failing states. The paper
then  goes  on  to  explore  the  argument  surrounding  the  extent  of  government
responsibility in prohibiting their citizens from engaging in mercenary activities. More
recently, governments, especially in Africa, have wanted to include individual criminal
liability  as  well  as  state  liability  in  the  Conventions,  thus  making  it  possible  for  an
individual to be prosecuted for just being a mercenary, as well as for unlawful acts carried
out while fighting as a mercenary. Addressing these issues in international law will take
time, especially while major political leaders are unsure of the future direction of the use
of military force. Until this time, it is unlikely they will act to either enhance this part of
the private security market or restrict it.3 
 
Changing the Law and the Rise of Mercenarism Post
1945  
4 A long-standing problem with controlling the use of mercenaries has been the limit of
modern legal analysis and precedent setting surrounding the problem. Some early legal
writers  did  concern  themselves  with  the  practice  of  hiring  mercenaries,  but  with
mercenary forces playing such an integral part in the formation of European armies such
concerns were largely  ignored until  the middle  of  the 19th century.  It  was  a  similar
picture outside of Europe. Though, as a consequence of their use in colonial conflicts and
other situations that served the national interests, their demise took longer, if it occurred
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at all. For example, the French Foreign Legion is a mercenary force that was originally
recruited to protect French colonial possessions4and yet itstill exists today. 
5 Prior  to  1945,  concerns  to  do  with  mercenaries  were  expressed  largely  through the
development of the law of neutrality. A country that allowed its national territory to be
used for the purpose of the recruitment or enlistment of mercenaries was deemed to be
in support of a belligerent. This was a position that was likely to draw the neutral country
into a conflict it had no interest in through retaliatory action by one of the belligerents.
As  a  result,  provisions  were  included  in  the  1907  Hague  Convention  prohibiting
mercenary recruitment on national territory.5 Such obligations were limited to countries
policing their own national territory, and were not extended to include the prevention of
nationals crossing over to another country to enlist in the army of a belligerent as, for
example, was the case of foreign individuals who enlisted in the International Brigades in
the Spanish Civil War. A number of states did introduce domestic legislation to reinforce
their international obligation, while a few sought to control the actions of its citizens
wishing to enlist in foreign armies.
6 After the Second World War, significant changes were made to the law regulating the use
of force in international politics. Even so, such changes to legislation that did occur did
not address the question of the involvement of mercenaries in combat. Considering the
numerous conflicts, including that of ideology that surfaced between the United States
and  the  Soviet  Union  immediately  after  the  war,  the  introduction  of  regulations
concerned with controlling the activities of mercenaries was of minor concern to the
international community. This indifference changed during the period of decolonisation
in  the  1960s.  This  period  witnessed  a  marked  increase  in  mercenary  numbers  and
activities, especially in countries of central Africa. For example, mercenaries such as Mad
Mike Hore, Jacques Schramme and Bob Denard all fought in the Congo in the 1960s.  The
concept  of  mercenaries  now  took  on  greater  importance  for  the  international
community, but more so for those African countries directly affected by the presence of
mercenaries  involved  in  their  wars  of  liberation.  Even  so,  the  response  of  the
International Community was to do little more than re-affirm Article 2(4) of the United
Nations (UN) Charter,6explaining the logical implications of the Article.
7 It was not until the late 1960s that the use of mercenaries against national liberation
movements fighting for independence in colonial territories was declared a criminal act
by UN General Assembly Resolution 2465,7 thus designating mercenaries as outlaws.8 This
position  was  further  endorsed  through  subsequent  resolutions  concerned  with
colonialism. This, as Taulbee explains, marked a significant move away from the idea of
collective  liability of  the  traditional  law  toward  individual  criminal  liability.  These
resolutions further called for third party states to observe traditional law prohibiting
mercenary recruitment on their national territory, and to introduce laws forbidding their
nationals from engaging in mercenary activities.9 
8 The  OAU Convention,  adopted  in  1972,  for  the  Elimination  of  Mercenaries  in  Africa
mirrors those trends found in UN resolutions concerning mercenaries.10 The Convention
also extended state obligation regarding the control of the activities of its nationals, by
making states responsible for the prohibition and punishment of any activity connected
with mercenaries that may occur within their jurisdiction.11  The move away from the
traditional view that states are individually accountable,  to a collective responsibility
towards accountability  is  the result  of  the OAU Convention placing an obligation on
individuals who meet its requirement. Individuals have to either fulfil the requirements
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in Article One,12 which defines what a mercenary is, or the requirements regarding those
people who recruit or assist mercenaries through training, financial help, or protection of
prosecution. Further to this departure is the adoption of obligations by contracting States
to stop their nationals from participating in mercenary activities as defined by the above
Convention.13 As  such,  contracting  States  must  endeavour  to  prosecute  any  person,
whatever nationality, within their jurisdiction, who is accused of mercenary activity.14
The relevant Article One reads as follows:15
• [A] ‘mercenary’ is classified as anyone who, not a national of the state against which his
actions are directed, is employed, enrols or links himself willingly to a person, group or
organisation whose aim is:
• (a) To overthrow by force of arms or by any other means the government of that Member
State of the Organisation of African Unity;
• (b) To undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal working of the
institutions of the said State;
• (c) To block by any means the activities of any liberation movements recognised by the
Organisation of African Unity. 
9 Even with these provisions, the OAU Convention does not totally forbid the recruitment
of mercenaries. In accordance with Article One, governments, or any other groups, are
prohibited from employing mercenaries to defend themselves from those actions carried
out  by  a  liberation  movement  recognised  by  the  OAU.  The  aim  of  the  Article  was
primarily  to  stop  European  mercenaries  fighting  for  the  minority  governments  of
Rhodesia and South Africa. However, non-nationals that fall outside the defined category
of mercenary may be employed by a government to defend itself from dissident groups
within its own borders, as in the case of the Cuban troops that fought on the side of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the Angolan civil war. The
reason for  this  was  to  allow African  governments  to  give  support  to  movements  of
national  liberation,  without allowing conditions to emerge in their own country that
might  encourage  such  dissident  groups  to  operate  against  them.16At  the  same  time,
African governments wanted to deny the opportunity to mercenaries to operate against
the same movements of national liberation.
10 The capture and subsequent trial of thirteen mercenaries in Angola in 1976 again focused
international attention on mercenary activity.  All  the accused were charged with the
crime of being a mercenary.17 Of the thirteen accused, four were sentenced to death, and
the others to long prison sentences. As a result of the trial, the Luanda Draft Convention
on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenaries (1976) was issued.18 The Luanda Draft
Convention  again  stressed  the  responsibility  of  individual  states  to  prevent  their
nationals from taking part in mercenary activities, as well as those individual persons
defined as mercenaries. State responsibility, as such, is conveyed in Article 319 that makes
government officials  who undertake to employ,  aid,  or recruit  mercenaries liable for
criminal prosecution. Thus, failure by a State to carry out the prosecution of officials who
had undertaken such activities would, argues Taulbee, ‘create international responsibility
on the part of the offending State’.20 Article 521 represents the attitude of the members of
the Popular Revolutionary Tribunal who presided over the trial, in that, ‘a mercenary
bears responsibility both for being a mercenary and for any other crime committed by
him  as  such’.22 Possibly  the  most  important  Article  was  Article  4, 23 which  deprived
mercenaries of the status of being a lawful combatant. Captured mercenaries were, as
such,  not  given the protected status  of  prisoners-of-war.  This,  as  Hampson explains,
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‘violated the principle of equality of belligerents and confused the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello’.24 This provision was later incorporated into the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I.25
However, the definition of mercenary as decided upon by the Geneva conferees is more
limited in scope than that expressed in the Luanda Draft Convention. At the same time,
Additional Protocol I does allow for States to offer to mercenaries prisoner-of-war status
if they so wish. What is clearly understood, and addressed in Additional Protocol II,26 is
that  mercenaries  are  entitled  to  the  basic  humanitarian  treatment  and  protections
provided for  persons in the power of  a  party to  the conflict  who are not  otherwise
entitled to more favourable treatment.  
 
A Legal Definition 
11 How then should we define a mercenary? The traditional notion of a mercenary is ‘a
soldier willing to sell his military skills to the highest bidder, no matter what the cause’.27
Mockler, on the other hand, believes the true mark of a mercenary is ‘a devotion to war
for  its  own sake.  By this,  the  mercenary can be distinguished from the professional
soldier whose mark is  generally a devotion to the external  trappings of  the military
profession rather than to the actual fighting’.28  While such general definitions may be
true, they do not address the question of a precise definition. The task of addressing such
a question is essential if individual persons are to be denied important legal rights as a
consequence of falling into a particular category. But also, as international law covering
mercenaries evolves, States will have no option but to take on the obligation to control
those activities determined by the scope of the definition.
12 The definition that finally emerged, set out in Additional Protocol I to Article 47 of the
Geneva Convention (1949), only did so after states ensured their political interests were
looked after. As such, the definition has allowed for competing state interests, while it has
also had to balance precision with significance. As Taulbee notes, it has had to strike a
balance  between  a  need  to  provide  general  parameters  for  evaluating  contextual
elements,  and  requirements  that  attempt  rigorous  and  exhaustive  descriptions  of
persons, situations and activities.29 A definition that is too detailed might be too rigid, and
thus unable to accommodate changes as circumstances demand. On the other hand, a
brief definition that allows a judgement in its application leaves open the possibility of
abuse. A very general definition would allow the interpretation of the terms to be too
openly susceptible to political or ideological calculations.          
13  The actual definition in international law as set out in Additional Protocol I to Article 47
of  the  Geneva  Convention  (1949)  classifies  a  mercenary  according  to  the  following
criteria:30
• (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict;
• (b) Does, in fact, take part in activities;
• (c) Is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain
• (d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory controlled by a
Party to the conflict;
• (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
• (f) Has not been sent by a State, which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a
member of its armed forces.
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14 The wording of the definition is such as to exclude those foreign nationals in the service
of the armed forces of another country, as with those individuals that served in the
International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, and where the international community
is  willing  to  tolerate  such  persons,  from falling  within  the  definition  of  mercenary.
Furthermore, Article 47 of Protocol I ignores foreign military personnel integrated into
the armed forces of another state. Included here would be the French Foreign Legion, and
Gurkhas. The definition also leaves out those induced by ideology31 or religion, and those
who may not participate directly in the hostilities. Finally, those foreigners employed as
advisors and trainers are also not included in the definition.
15 Without a clear working definition, the problem arises of how to ensure states comply
with international  laws relating to the control  mercenaries.  While states accepted in
principle, through the adoption of General Assembly resolutions, not to permit by way of
action or omission an armed group launching an invasion of another state from within its
own borders, member states still failed to restrain their citizens from enlisting in
mercenary groups. As a result of this failure, the international community recognised the
need for a multilateral convention. During the course of the thirty-fifth session of the
General Assembly it was therefore decided to draft an International Convention against
the  recruitment,  use,  financing  and  training  of  mercenaries.  The  Convention  was
presented to the General Assembly for signature and ratification in December 1989. The
Convention adopts a more inclusive definition than that found in the Additional Protocol
I.  As  a  result,  the  recruitment,  use,  financing  and  training  of  mercenaries  are  also
declared to be offences. But, while such an inclusive definition is not in itself a problem,
there is a problem in policing the activities of individuals engaged in the above activities.
We will return to the Drafting of an International Convention against the recruitment,
use, financing and training of mercenaries later. First, there is a need to examine the
issues connected with the problems of constructing an adequate legal definition of the
term mercenary. 
16 The  Additional  Protocol  I  must  still  rely  on  motivation  when  making  a  distinction
between mercenaries and other types of combatants. Western States have been highly
critical of this point. The motivation for mercenaries is money. Thus explains Abraham, ‘a
mercenary is motivated … essentially by the desire for private gain’.32 However, as the
Diplock  report,  which  was  published  in  1976  following  the  involvement  of  British
mercenaries  in  Angola,  makes  clear  the  chances  of  determining  the  motivation  of
combatants is virtually impossible:
“… any definition of mercenaries which require positive proof of motivation would
either be unworkable, or so haphazard in its application as between comparable
individuals as to be unacceptable. Mercenaries, we think, can only be defined by
reference to what they do, and not by reference to why they do it.33”. 
17 While motivation should not comprise the sole definitional element, objections to its use
as part of the definition are also unconvincing. In domestic law, critical distinctions based
upon motivation are regularly made.34 There also appear to be no grounds for objecting to
the evidence needed to establish motivation under the test in Additional Protocol I. The
point being made here is that it is very difficult to obtain the necessary evidence to prove
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the first five elements of Taulbee’s list, included below, since it means having access to
the records of the opposing party to the conflict, a situation unlikely to occur. 
18 Taulbee identifies 6 issues relating to the problem of distinguishing mercenaries from
other foreign volunteers. They are:35 
• (1) Whether a distinction should be drawn between non-nationals and resident non-
nationals;
• (2) Whether a “mercenary” includes all who meet certain operative tests, or whether some
overt actions directly related to hostilities are necessary;
• (3) Whether outside private forces and national troops should be considered different from
third party states;
• (4) Whether individuals recruited for a specific conflict should be distinguished from those
recruited under other circumstances;
• (5) Whether motive should be defined through objective tests; 
• (6) Whether a legal distinction should be drawn between legitimate and non-legitimate
movements for national liberation.
19 However, the problem of obtaining evidence necessary for a prosecution exists with all
statutes that provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals, and, as such, there
are no real grounds to object to matters of this concern.36 More important is the question
of compensation, which is seen as essential to establishing a distinction in motivations.
For African states, compensation by way of private gain distinguishes mercenaries from
non-resident non-nationals who volunteer to aid legitimate liberation movements. If the
drive  for  private  gain  is removed  from the  definition,  then  the  definition  holds  no
substantive content. The term mercenary would simply describe all non-resident non-
nationals that have chosen to fight for whatever reason, including political and religious
ones.  This  therefore  appears  to  be  an important  test  in  determining the status  of  a
combatant in war. Though at present it is unclear how states would test for compensation
that might take a number of forms other than monetary. 
20 Origin also serves to define the term mercenary. A mercenary is neither a national of a
party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory controlled by a party to the conflict.
Instead they are generally ‘bands of professional soldiers … temporarily united, under
leaders of strong personality, fighting for pay and the [spoils of war], but not entirely
indifferent to claims of honour and legality, or to the interests of their country of origin’.
37 The idea of using origin in international law to help determine the apportionment of
rights and obligations of a national may not necessarily be the most effective way of
linking an individual  to  a  specific  territory.  Non-nationals  often reside  in  territories
where  conflicts  erupt.  As  such,  even  as  a  non-national,  they  may  feel  they  have  a
substantial interest to protect. Such a person might also have important skills, as well as
local knowledge, that one of the parties to the conflict may be prepared to pay a premium
wage  for.  Yet  under  the  OAU  Convention38 and  the  Luanda  Draft  Convention, 39 this
particular  type  of  individual  could  be  deemed  a  mercenary.  Their  status  is  wholly
dependent on the party they choose to fight for in a conflict.  The critical  test being
whether such a person opposes movements for self-determination, or liberation.40  
21 The definition of mercenary as noted above in Additional Protocol I gives conservative
answers to the above questions. Furthermore, for a person to qualify as a mercenary they
must meet all of the tests in the definition consecutively.41 As previously discussed, any
person deemed a mercenary has no right to the protected status of  a combatant,  or
prisoner-of-war  that  a  soldier  serving  in  a  state  military  will  have.  The  purpose  of
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Additional  Protocol  I  and II  is  to ensure that those participating in struggles against
colonial domination, racist regimes, or alien domination are given protected status, while
the  provisions  also  apply  to  the  use  of  mercenaries  in  general.  The enlistment  of
mercenaries in national liberation movements is,  again, not singled out. This point is
interesting since the Additional Protocol I definition does not mirror the general thrust of
the language of previous UN resolutions or of the OAU and Luanda Draft Conventions.
22 The Additional Protocol I definition represented a compromise in that members of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphatically argued
that criminal liability can only come from the performance of specific acts of war42 while
the majority of other nations wanted a broader definition of mercenary to include the
idea that status alone was also a criminal act. Those states that sought a more inclusive
definition pointed to  the fact  that  by voluntarily  enlisting in a  mercenary force the
person was signifying intent, and, as such, enlistment should automatically subject the
individual  to  criminal  liability.  Thus,  placing  an  emphasis  on  the  voluntary  act  of
enlistment meant that the determining of mercenary status carries an additional onus.
Any person carrying out those acts listed above in the draft conventions, including the
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, would
be  liable  for  prosecution,  thereby  supplying  a  necessary  deterrent  upon  such  an
individual.
23 African states have also attempted to extend the definition of mercenary to include those
mercenaries not covered under the definition in Additional Protocol I. A number of states
have argued that Additional Protocol I only covers those mercenaries engaged in armed
conflicts  of  an  international  nature.  The  Protocol  does  not  cover  civil  wars  where
mercenary activity is most prevalent. As such, any useful definition of mercenary must
include situations of intrastate wars, as well as meet the criteria of international armed
conflict. 
24 Delegates from the West have agreed that the 1977 Nigerian Draft Convention for the
Elimination of  Mercenaries in Africa should address those situations that fall  outside
those covered by Additional Protocol I. In agreeing to this position, Western states assert
two principal positions be met. First, that the definition in Additional Protocol I does not
apply only to situations of international armed conflict,43 and second, any definition set
out in future conventions remains consistent with the Additional Protocol I definition so
as to maintain the integrity of the regime established in Additional Protocols I and II. Any
additional circumstances that do not fall under international armed conflict should be
presented in a form that is in line with the Additional Protocol I definition.44 Western
states argue that the correct way of addressing the above problem is to prohibit certain
acts and activities within a carefully specified context. These delegates, argues Taulbee,45
must widen the contingencies to which the Additional Protocol I definition would apply,
rather than expanding the classes of activities and individuals included in the definition
proper. 
25 The result of these discussions, to reconcile opposing views between different member
states of the UN, was,  as mentioned previously,  the introduction of the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries on the 4
th December 1989.46 The articles included in the Convention embrace more closely those
ideas  advocated  by  African  states.  The  Convention  diverges  somewhat  from  the
conservative emphasis  of  Additional  Protocol  I.  The approach adopted is  the specific
offences approach for extending the definition of  mercenarism to situations that fall
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outside international armed conflict. Thus, those acts mentioned in the Convention’s title
become  equivalent  to  direct  participation  within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  of
Additional Protocol I. 
26 The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries  is  not  beyond  criticism.  Abraham  points  to  three  areas  where  the
Convention is deemed problematic:47
• (1) Only when the crime of mercenarism is committed within the boundaries of a state or by
a national of a state is that state accorded jurisdiction to deal with the crime;
• (2) In the event of conflict, the Convention denies to the aggrieved state the right to proceed
against an offending state;
• (3) The Convention provides for no monitoring mechanism of its provisions, thus placing
that responsibility on the individual member states.  
27 Since 1989, when the Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries was signed,  The United Nations General  Assembly has continued to pass
resolutions concerned with the activities of mercenaries. Such resolutions, as previously
explained,  have,  in general,  reflected the restricted nature of  the ban on the use of
mercenaries,  as  well  as  those  traditional  worries  expressed  by  the  international
community towards the activity of individuals engaged in mercenary activities,48 while
also dealing with the actions of mercenaries in a variety of different circumstances. These
include the destabilising of neighbouring states, acting as the vanguard for a coup in a
small state,  the hindering of movements of national liberation in their drive towards
independence, and the violation of human rights.49 The object of these resolutions is to
highlight  the  fact  that  the  actions  of  mercenaries  contravene  basic  principles  of
international  law,  including  non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  states,  and
territorial integrity, and independence.50 This type of mercenarism is described by Marie-
France Major as ‘an international wrongful act’.51
28 Again there is no total ban on the use of mercenaries under international customary law.
Those  conventions  introduced  by  the  international  community  have  focused  on  the
prohibition of  mercenary activities aimed at  the sovereignty of  legitimate states,  the
suppression of movements of national liberation, or national self-determination. Those
activities undertaken by PMCs in Africa and other parts of the world have, in the majority
of cases, fallen outside of this characterisation. We will return to this issue later. But
briefly,  they  have  not  been  seen  to  challenge  the  sovereignty  of  states,  oppose
movements  of  national  liberation,  or  been  directed  against  movements  of  self-
determination.  As  Zarate  argues,  in  Africa  there  has  developed  ‘a  clear  distinction
between foreign support of  legitimate  African regimes  and individualised  mercenary
attempts to wreak havoc in the region’.52  
29 The continued effort to condemn mercenarism through the different political institutions
of the UN is seen by some, whose objective is to interpret that part of international law
concerned with mercenary activity, as constituting evidence of a rule, ‘that states have a
legal obligation, which goes beyond the traditional constraints of international law, to
control the recruitment of its nationals in situations where a threat to peace and security
exists’.53 Those that support this argument fail to recognise that such condemnation and
resolutions have been directed at specific conflicts, which have seen mercenaries pose a
potential  threat  to  international  peace  and  security.  As  such,  these  resolutions  and
condemnations  do  not  necessarily  constitute  a  blanket  opposition  to  the  use  of
mercenaries.      
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30 Expanding on this argument, even where the condemnation and resolutions expressed
have been more general  in their range and meaning,  the statements do not endorse
customary international norms. In this instance, the General Assembly does not have the
authority, under the UN Charter, to enact, alter, or to terminate rules of international
law. Thus, the proliferation over the last four decades of resolutions and repetition of
recommendations regarding mercenaries does not amount to evidence of practice on the
part of states, and opinio juris that would be necessary for such practice to constitute
international  law.  All  such resolutions and recommendations that  originate from the
General  Assembly  or  those  regional  organisations  including  the  OAU  can  do  is  to
contribute to the eventual establishment of a future customary rule of international law.
Further to this argument is the issue of ratification. For the International Convention
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries to constitute settled
international law the Convention must be ratified. As the Convention stands at present,
only sixteen states have become signatories. Of these, three, Angola, Congo, and Nigeria,
have all hired, or had direct dealings with PMCs.54 The Convention needs twenty two
signatures for it to pass into law. In this respect, the legal impact of the Convention is
further  reduced,  giving additional  weight  to  attempts  to  undermine the above claim
regarding customary rule of international law.55
 
Mercenaries and State Responsibility
31 The notion that states have responsibilities has in the past been linked to the idea of
territorial  sovereignty.  While a  state can demand that  it  receives the same rights  of
independence  and  territorial  integrity  as  any  other  state  that  is  a  member  of  the
international community, holding such rights necessitates an obligation on the part of all
states to respect and protect these rights when applied to other states. Taulbee notes that
there are two areas of responsibility a state recognises when it violates international law.
First, loss and damage resulting from the act; and second, delinquency imputed to the
state.56 The validity of these propositions has been rarely disputed.57 
32 The topic of the debate has primarily been the connection between non-performance of
duties  and  consequent  liability.  The  point  of  contention  is  realising  a  standard  of
performance required by states within the context of the extent of its own legal authority
in protecting the rights of other states. A state’s standard of performance in controlling
mercenary activities, as well as PMCs, is only one part of this ongoing debate. The idea of
statehood suggests  states are able to perform certain functions.  One function that  is
presumed  to  be  within  the  capacity  of  the  incumbent  government,  since  they  have
absolute authority over their territory,  is  to police the activities of its own nationals
within its  own borders.58 Garcia-Mora argues  that  a  ‘[s]tate  which fails  to  prevent  a
harmful act against another state has violated an international obligation to preserve
world order.59 Furthermore, even if a state has clearly used all of its means to prevent an
unlawful act against a foreign state, but has not remedied the situation, it has failed to
discharge its obligation and will remain liable’.60  
33 The implication for states of failing to carry out their international responsibilities to
other member states is that there be imposed on them, through arbitral tribunals and
courts, an absolute standard of liability. In the past, relative standards have been imposed
and have sought to include two components: knowledge and capacity. The fact that a
state knows of a harmful act, or one that is to be carried out is not in or of itself sufficient
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to establish responsibility. Even so, traditional international law does require states to
demonstrate good intentions by extending all reasonable efforts to protect member states
from acts of aggression by their nationals, and or, to punish offenders.
34 The issue as to the extent a state can, or should, be held responsible for its nationals
engaged in mercenary activity is a contentious one. This is even more so now that there is
a reliance on motivation in the definition of mercenary found in both the Additional
Protocol and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries. In this respect, both conventions ignore the accountability of
states regarding the actions carried out by their nationals. Indeed, as Abraham points out,
‘[t]hose peremptory norms which do in fact exist continue to shy away from imputing
responsibility to a state for the actions of its citizens’.61 This reluctance is, in part, related
to  ‘the  international  community’s  fear  of  mercenaries,  …  in  that  they  are  wholly
independent from any constraints built into the nation state system’.62 Thus, it is argued
that states are extremely limited as to what they can actually do to prevent nationals
from carrying out mercenary activities, and should therefore not be held responsible for
those nationals that undertake such activities. A state that accepts such a proposition
ignores its own obligations of respect for territorial integrity and political independence
of  other  member  states  in  the  international  community,  and  as  such  neglects  its
responsibility  to  ensure  its  own  nationals  behave  in  a  manner  that  serves  not  to
undermine those obligations. If this problem is to be addressed, then international law
will have to have incorporated within it the power to attribute responsibility to states for
the actions of its nationals. Such responsibility would arise from the acknowledgement by
states  of  the  fact  that  membership  of  the  international  community  accords  such  a
responsibility on the modern state.
35 Ultimately,  the  core  of  this  argument  is  not  whether  a  state  has  a  responsibility
ascertaining to obligations to the international community, this is not disputed, but how
far this responsibility reaches. The law has in the past deemed it unreasonable to attempt
to attach responsibility to a state where there has been a satisfactory attempt by that
state to stop those actions caused by their own nationals that might lead to an act of
injury on another state. Thus, without the state concerned having prior knowledge of
those actions, there is limited action it can take to prevent such actions occurring, and, as
such,  the  international  community  has  not  felt  it  appropriate  to  punish  the  state
concerned over those actions carried out by its  nationals.  Furthermore,  many states,
especially  less  developed  ones,  do  not  have  the  necessary  resources  to  control  the
movements  and  actions  of  their  nationals.  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that  the
international  community  has  supported  attempts  by  individual states  to  introduce
legislation and administrative measures to control the actions of their nationals, which
they see  as  the easier  route.  Such legislative  action is  within the capability  of  most
member states, including most of the less developed, of the international community.      
36 The driving force for legislation against mercenaries has on the whole come from Third
World  states.  African  states,  in  particular,  have  sought  to  negotiate  a  multilateral
convention concerning the use of mercenaries in armed conflicts around the world. This
is not surprising. If we trace the history of mercenary involvement in armed conflicts
since the 1960s we see that most have taken place on the African continent, and are
continuing to do so. As a result of this, most recent commentaries have argued that there
is  now  the  need  to  strengthen  existing  laws  concerning  all  aspects  of  mercenary
activities, as well as to make states more accountable for the actions of their citizens.
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While the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of  Mercenaries  has  addressed  the  need  to  prohibit  the  activities  of  individual
mercenaries, or groups of mercenaries, it has failed to apportion blame to states for the
actions of its citizens who conduct such activities. As such, the impact the Convention has
had on preventing mercenaries from applying their trade has been much reduced. The
meaning of the Convention can therefore be seen as more symbolic than substantive.
Current efforts and concerns might also be directed at a phenomenon that is in reality
transitory in nature.            
 
Private Military Companies or Corporate Mercenaries:
A Legal Distinction
37 The argument so far has been with regard to the problems associated with constructing a
legal definition of mercenarism, and a state’s responsibility in preventing their nationals
from participating in mercenary activities. Thus, we have seen how difficult it is to give
an exact  legal  definition of  mercenarism that  covers  every eventuality of  mercenary
activity,  and which states accept and are therefore willing to subscribe to.  In such a
difficult environment any attempt to brand those working for private military companies
(PMCs) as mercenaries only further complicates the issue of definition. David Shearer
draws on this, pointing out the significant problems of applying the criteria of Article 47
to  the  personnel  of  military  companies.  Shearer  highlights  four  major  areas  of
contention:63
• (1) Under sub-paragraph (a), recruitment must be specifically for a particular armed
conflict. Since many personnel working for military companies are employed on a long-term
basis, they arguably cannot be considered mercenaries.
• (2) The requirement that mercenaries take a direct part in hostilities, as required by sub-
paragraph (b), would exclude individuals acting as foreign military advisers and technicians.
… Most security firms, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) of the US for
example, exclude themselves from the definition of mercenary on this basis. 
• (3) The need to establish a ‘desire for private gain’ under sub-paragraph (c) is difficult to
prove because it introduces a psychological element, motivation. This concern has been
extensively discussed above.
• (4) Under sub-paragraph (c), a member of the armed forces of a party to a conflict cannot
also be considered a mercenary. Consequently, by becoming a member of a county’s
military, contracted fighters avoid the label of mercenary under sub-paragraph (e).
Sandline, in its contract with the Papua New Guinea government, termed its employees
‘Special Constables’, no doubt to reinforce this distinction.
38 Employees of PMCs, whose job it is to provide military support, are frequently accused of
being mercenaries, but with a smart business veneer to hide this fact, and are therefore
seen as operating illegally. Although problematical, establishing the legal status of PMCs
is therefore important since it has implications for the conduct of employees of PMCs
involved in the promotion of international security in general. While such exclusions, as
commented on by Shearer, are in reality technicalities, with each section left sufficiently
open so as to be able to question its actual meaning, taken together they render Article 47
unworkable for both the individual mercenary and PMCs.64 This is of course intentional.
African states have in their construction of the legal definition of mercenarism, been
careful to ensure that such a definition is sufficiently open to dispute, and this allows
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them  the  opportunity  to  employ  whatever  military  force  they  deem  necessary  to
maintain power. 
39 Should we therefore define those working for PMCs as mercenaries? This is more of a
political than legal question in that reasons for deciding either way will invariably be
politically driven. Those opposed to any private military involvement in war argue that
those who work for PMCs should only be described as mercenaries and that no other label
should be attached that might conceal this fact. For this group, state armies, or national
liberation  movements,  representing  political  communities,  are  the  only  forces  that
should be allowed to conduct war. War is the domain of these two groups, and, as such,
they  are  responsible  for  the  physical  protection of  the  communities  they  represent.
PMCs, on the other hand, are often seen as representing the economic interests of a
minority group, normally Western interests that share nothing in common with those
they are charged with protecting. Those that carry out the work of PMCs should therefore
be classified as mercenaries, in that they represent an organisation willing to sell military
skills to the highest bidder, no matter what the cause. The only exceptions are those
foreigners that choose to fight because of their political convictions. Such a person or
group of persons receive no economic benefits from fighting, unlike those working for
PMCs, and are therefore described as volunteers. 
40 Those opposed to this argument point to the political agendas of those who describe
PMCs as representing nothing more than corporate mercenaries. This is especially the
case  of  those  military  forces  that  see  themselves  as  victims of the  success  of  PMCs,
whether they are themselves legitimately recognised by their own people or not. In the
end it is left up to the conscience of the individual, influenced by his own political beliefs
and values, as to whether a person contracted to give military assistance to a foreign
army  is  a  mercenary,  volunteer,  or  security  advisor.  Finally,  regarding  the  issue  of
regulating PMCs, if the international community is that unclear as to its intentions about
whether the actions of PMCs should be made illegal, then the alternative is to control
them through regulation. 
41 The problem of definition is clearly related to the political problems associated with the
reluctance of states to exclude the use of mercenaries. The result of this reluctance has
seen  the  emergence  of  tension  between  African  states  in  particular,  and  the  West,
especially  Europe.  While  African leaders  have been the driving force behind shaping
international law regarding mercenaries, the West remains cautious. Such tensions are
noticeable in The Additional Protocol 1 definition. Indeed, as where OECD countries see
criminal liability coming from the performance of specific acts in war, the majority of
nations have sought to include the idea of status alone as a criminal act, thus establishing
a more inclusive definition. Attempts to resolve these tensions are proving difficult.
42 As this  paper has  explained,  current  international  legislation on mercenaries  is  very
limited in its effectiveness.65 The weakness of the law is of course intended.Governments,
but  notably  African  governments,  see  no  reason  to  deny  themselves  access  to  a
potentially valuable source of military expertise. All the international community has
wanted to do for the last 5 decades is to remove freelance mercenaries from those wars it
would prefer them to stay out of. This is particularly so of African governments who have
been the target for these freelance mercenaries in the majority of cases, and still are
today.
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43 Finally, international law at present makes no mention of PMCs. This is not surprising
considering the recent appearance of these organisations on the international stage. The
problem now is if, in the future governments do allow PMCs to actively engage in civil
wars on their behalf, failure to achieve a legal separation66 could see the employees of
PMCs having their combat status legally challenged by the other side, leading to dire
consequences for any employee unlucky enough to be taken captive.  In this  respect,
international law has two important roles to play if PMCs are to act on behalf of the
international community. First,  it  must protect the combat status of PMCs employees
actively engaged in fighting. Second, it must allow PMCs go about their lawful business,
while prohibiting the activities of the classic mercenary. These will not be easy tasks to
achieve, but they must if PMCs are to work for the international community. 
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